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TEXT AND PRINCIPLE IN JOHN
MARSHALL'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
CASES OF MARB URY AND MCCULLOCH
SYLVIA SNOWISS*

INTRODUCTION

After two centuries of practice, difficulties confronting
American constitutional law have been increasingly formulated in
terms of the conflicting characterizations of the Constitution in
two of Chief Justice John Marshall's leading opinions, Marbury v.
Madison' and McCulloch v. Maryland.! The Marbury constitution
is "superior paramount law,.., the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation"3 that extends the restraint of law to government.
Its binding quality derives from its commitment to writing, in
contrast to an unwritten constitution that cannot bind literally or
legally. The written Constitution is to be enforced in court in
conformity with conventional legal standards and norms. Its
meaning in particular cases is to be determined through exposition
of its text in light of intent, and in fidelity to the requirement that
judges enforce existing law and not make new law.
The McCulloch constitution stresses the differences in the
"nature,"4 "character... and... properties" of the law that governs
government from those of ordinary law. Constitutional provisions,
by design, lack the "prolixity" or substantive content of
conventional legal text. As part of an instrument "intended to
Professor, Department of Political Science, California State
University,
Northridge. Research for this paper was supported in part by the Office of
Research and Sponsored Projects, California State University, Northridge. I
am grateful to Douglas C. Dow for many stimulating conversations and
helpful comments.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14, 73-75, 105-06 (1962) (discussing

constitutional law in the context of Marbury and McCulloch); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852-54 (1989) (discussing
constitutional law in the context of Marbury and McCulloch).
3. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
4. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.

5. Id. at 415.
6. Id. at 407.
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endure for ages to come,"7 they set out the objects and ends of
government in general terms. In fulfillment of governmental
responsibility to meet the unpredictable exigencies and "crises of
human affairs," application of broad constitutional principles in
particular cases involves adaptation and interpretation in light of
contemporary needs and values.
Conflict between the Marbury and McCulloch constitutions
did not manifest itself until considerably after Marshall's tenure
on the Court. It was brought to the surface by difficulties in the
two great enterprises of twentieth-century judicial review. The
first denied to government authority to regulate the economy on
the grounds that such regulation violated a constitutional liberty
of contract and associated rights of property, as well as the scope
of national authority over commerce. This position was intelligible
as enforcement of text and an original intent under the Marbury
constitution.9 However, in denying to government the capacity to
respond to the challenges generated by industrialization and
urbanization, including the great depression, Marbury laid bare
difficulties in its characterization of the "law" that governs
government. When Justice Arthur Sutherland, following Marbury,
argued that Contract Clause text and intent denied Minnesota
authority to pass debtor relief legislation in the middle of the
depression,"° Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes countered by
invoking McCulloch." Within a few years of this exchange, the
Court retreated from its insistence that the Constitution denied
government the tools of modern economic regulation.
In the
process, it validated important parts of the McCulloch
constitution.
The second great enterprise of twentieth-century judicial
review was its heightened protection of individual liberties and
civil rights under the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment
that began as the Court retreated from its strong defense of
property rights. Leading decisions in this area held that longstanding state governmental practices violated constitutional

7. Id. at 415.
8. Id.

9. Since the 1930s, the doctrine of liberty of contract has been understood
to rest in extra-textual sources. When first enunciated, it was intelligible as
judicial exposition of the word "liberty" as informed by an existing legal
content based in common law. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1897). See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166-67
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on the place of text and common

law in the liberty of contract cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
10. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-65 (1934).
11. Id. at 442-43.
12. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); National Labor
Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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limits, reinterpreted in light of contemporary needs and values.
Practices so overturned included racial segregation, 1" legislative
apportionment plans devised before urbanization,"' insulation of
state governments from the limits of the Bill of Rights, 1" and
relatively restrictive conceptions of freedom of speech and press. 6
These decisions strained, in varying degree, Marbury's law
enforcement rationale, but are readily accounted for as adaptation
of principle under McCulloch. However, under separation of
powers meeting contemporary needs and implementation of
contemporary values is a legislative, not judicial, responsibility.
Consensus on the results of key individual and civil rights
decisions has quieted this objection in these cases but the objection
returns with every contentious Court holding and the McCulloch
constitution cannot meet it. McCulloch thus provides a superior
account of American constitutional development and constitutional
law's results, but is less able than Marbury to reconcile judicial
authority over legislation with the requirements of law and
democracy. 7 At the end of the twentieth-century, as the Court
returns to federalism questions without abandoning authoritative
exposition of constitutional limits, the conflict between the
Marbury and McCulloch constitutions expresses constitutional
law's central dilemma.
In this paper I will examine the conflict from the perspective
I will start from the
of Marshall's work and intentions.
proposition defended elsewhere 8 that the Marbury of 1803 was not
understood to have the meaning now attributed to it, as given
above. This developed over the course of the nineteenth-century in
response to Marshall's initiatives, and it is the substance and
13. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
14. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
(1964).
15. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
Amendment's right to a jury trial into
restrictions on the states); Malloy v. Hogan,

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1968) (incorporating the Sixth
the Fourteenth Amendment's
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating

the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's right
to assistance of counsel); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating
the Fourth Amendment); Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause). See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause).

16. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (rejecting the First
Amendment claim in this case, but noting that freedom of speech was no
longer restricted to the prohibition of prior restraints); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975) (arguing so without direct invocation of McCulloch).
18. See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE

CONSTITUTION (1990).
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consequences of these initiatives that are inconsistent with the
conceptualization of the Constitution in McCulloch. I will argue
that the initial and only tenable conception is some form of that
depicted in McCulloch. Marshall, for reasons I will consider,
initiated the modern Marbury constitution by textualizing and
He did so without open
legalizing constitutional principle.
acknowledgment and his innovations were accepted without
awareness of the transformation they entailed. Textualization is
most visible in the Contract Clause cases, where the latent conflict
between text and principle was masked by the overlap of
exposition of Contract Clause text with defense of the principle of
vested rights. In a less obvious way, and despite the rhetoric of
McCulloch, Marshall also textualized and legalized the grants of
power in the federalism cases. The conflict between text and
principle was masked in these cases by the Marshall Court's
acceptance of legislative adaptation of the grants of power, and by
the constitutional authorization to the judiciary to maintain the
supremacy of national law.
In the last third of the nineteenth-century judicial
invalidation of legislation expanded, likely beyond Marshall's
expectations. It did so under the modern reading of Marbury,
which was then articulated for the first time. 9 This modern
reading "codified" nineteenth-century practice, in the process
supporting its expansion. Over the next century, as the Court
applied and interpreted the entire constitutional text, enforcing its
interpretation of the grants and limits on power over legislative
ones to the contrary, the problems visible but muted in the
Contract Clause cases came to the fore. Constitutional text is too
general and its purposes too different from those of ordinary law
for its reliance on ordinary law means to produce results
conformable to the requirements of that law or to constitutional
purposes. The regular practice of constitutional law is driven
inevitably to encroachment on legislative authority and to
contemporary, extra-textual sources for its substantive content.
This accounts for the emergence of the McCulloch constitution,
which now coexists uneasily with that of Marbury. Understanding
the origin and transformations of the Marbury and McCulloch
constitutions cannot resolve the problems of legitimacy and
practice this historical development has generated. However, it
can clarify our understanding of them, identify certain proposed
solutions as unworkable, and help devise more satisfactory ones.
In seeking this clarification it is important to recognize that both
the Marbury and McCulloch constitutions have been formed and
19.

ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 117-

25 (1989) (documenting the paucity of citations to and discussions of Marbury
in the context of judicial review during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth
century).
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transformed by historical developments. Just as the initial
Constitution was textualized and legalized, the McCulloch
constitution is seen today through the lens of this legalized one.
My ultimate conclusion is that modern constitutional law is a
complex mixture of Marbury and McCulloch in which the
McCulloch constitution necessarily predominates.

I.

ENFORCING FUNDAMENTAL LAW

Looking backward from McCulloch and Marbury, the safest
generalization is that at the founding there existed no conception
of the modern Marbury constitution. The Marbury of 1803 rested
in the universal and hence unarticulated understanding that
constitutions, or fundamental law, were different in kind from
ordinary law and that each presented distinct enforcement
problems. The judicial enforcement contemplated in the Marbury
of 1803 was an extraordinary political act that judges were
allowed to perform, and was limited to the concededly
unconstitutional act. Its legitimacy was connected to the uniquely
judicial responsibility to ordinary law but enforcement of the
Constitution was not an extension of that authority, as it is
understood today.2"
The political character of constitutional enforcement followed
from the recognition that it is impossible to bind sovereign power
with the routine, peaceful mechanisms with which societies bind
individuals. Sovereign power inheres in the dominant political
and social forces in the community and only they are capable of
constitutional violation.
Attempted violations that do not
command the support of these forces are amenable to correction by
them. If the dominant forces initiate and/or support genuine
violation there is no other force available in the community to
counter it. If a court attempts to do so it stands in opposition to
societal force, not as an agent of that force, as is the case in
ordinary law. It is thus unavoidably political. To succeed it must
rally the community to reaffirm principles it showed itself willing
to violate, a process I characterized as a peaceful substitute for
revolution.2
20. See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 1-89.
21. But see Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original
Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 329, 335-349 (arguing that my account of the original
understanding is unsustainable). My account may be unsustainable, but it
cannot be for the reasons that Alfange gives, for these betray a failure to
understand the key components of the argument. The most basic is failure to
understand the depth of the difference in kind between fundamental and
ordinary law and the resulting sense in which judicial enforcement of the
Constitution was understood to be a political act. Alfange acknowledges two

differences: that fundamental law is supreme and, as it is addressed to
government, a court, in refusing to enforce an act is "necessarily exercising
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The understanding that constitutions lack a routine
enforcement mechanism informed the Constitutional Convention's
reliance on checks and balances and the extended republic to
achieve the limited government universally sought at the
American founding. Nothing in subsequent adoption of the Bill of
Rights, or support for its judicial enforcement by leading members
of the founding generation changed this understanding." More
importantly, two hundred years of constitutional law validates the
initial understanding. Our genuine constitutional violations,
almost a century-long denial to African-Americans of elementary
due process and the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment and of voting rights under the Fifteenth
Amendment, were impervious to judicial correction. At the same
time, modern judicial review occupied itself with choosing among
competing legitimate interpretations of the Constitution which, by
definition, do not violate it. The full force of this obvious and
uncomplicated point has been obscured by the rhetoric of the
modern Marbury constitution that sees all judicial determinations
of constitutionality over a legislative or executive one, to the
contrary, as "enforcement."
A corollary of the absence of a routine enforcement
mechanism for constitutions is their necessary dependence on
voluntary compliance.
No regime could survive genuine
constitutional violation with the frequency with which ordinary
law anticipates violation by some individuals. It would either end
violently, or lapse into general repression. This is the burden of
Learned Hand's observation that "a society so riven that the spirit
of moderation is gone, no court can save; ... a society where that
spirit flourishes, no court need save. .... "" Equally important,

constitutional maintenance, unlike that of ordinary law, does not
require authoritative resolution of contending, legitimate
interpretations.
Short of the necessarily rare unambiguous
violation, challenged governmental actions remain in force, as does
the integrity of constitutional principle, while the country debates
its proper application.
Debate at independence over whether the judiciary could
refuse to enforce certain legislative acts took place against this
shared understanding. The legitimacy of such a judicial authority

power over another branch of the government." Id. at 339. But the key
difference is the inability to subject restraints on sovereign power to routine
and peaceful, or legal, enforcement in circumstances of genuine violation.
Restraint on sovereign power, be it effectuated by a court, a revolution, or the
force of another sovereign, is always and necessarily political. I will identify
other misunderstandings in Alfange's analysis that follow from this
fundamental one at appropriate points below.
22. See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 91-99.
23. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952).
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was still unresolved at the time of the Constitutional Convention.
During the 1790s opposition to it disappeared with acceptance of
an argument first made by James Iredell in 178624 and repeated
with approval by Alexander Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 78,25
James Wilson in The Works of James Wilson,26 Spencer Roane and
Saint George Tucker in Kamper v. Hawkins,27 William Patterson
28
in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,
and John Marshall in Marbury
29
v. Madison.
The authority here defended centered on
enforcement of constitutional limits within an existing natural and
common law tradition of limited government. It was not directed
at enforcement of the Constitution's provisions on federalism or
the grants of power that implemented them. These provisions
were newly created for the union of the American states, and
enforcement of the supremacy of national law implementing the
Constitution's principles of federalism had been given to the courts
in the Supremacy Clause."
As could be expected, this
authorization did not resolve all problems connected with judicial
resolution of the conflicts over federalism. However, it did remove
objection to judicial authority to hold some legislation
unconstitutional,
and to make final determinations of
constitutionality in the face of contending, legitimate
interpretations. In tracing the antecedents of what are today the
Marbury and McCulloch constitutions I will follow the initial
practice of treating the limits and grants of power separately.
II.

ENFORCING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS

The initial debate over judicial authority to refuse to enforce
an unconstitutional act took place in the context of English
thought and practice. England was the model of successfully
24. 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL
145-49 (1949).
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 98-106 (Alexander Hamilton).
26. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 329-30 (Robert G. McCloskey, ed.,
1967).
27. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 35-40, 77-81 (1793).
28. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308-09 (1795).
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The new version of Iredell's argument in Kamper
v. Hawkins and Marbury v. Madison were made in the context of concurrent

review and separation of powers, and the constitutional provisions there
interpreted were neither specific limits on government nor grants of power to
Congress, but ones on judicial organization.

In Kamper the Virginia Court

applied the newly articulated defense of judicial authority over legislation to
its acknowledged authority to defend its own constitutional sphere, in the
course of invalidating legislative assignment of equity jurisdiction to common

law courts.

Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20; Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.

See

SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 83-89 (discussing the relationship of Kamper's

concurrent review to Iredell's defense of judicial autority over legislation, and
to Marbury). See also infra note 186.
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limited government and Americans accepted without dissent the
goal of limited government and many of the particular limits
identified in natural law principles and common law precedent. In
England, enforcement or preservation of limited government was
left in legislative hands under the practice of legislative
omnipotence. Judicial enforcement of recognized limits was
explicitly rejected by William Blackstone, the leading English legal
authority in the American states.
American constitutionalism has been so linked to judicial
review that the conjunction of limited government and legislative
omnipotence is jarring. Blackstone's defense of the latter rested in
the unavailability of a routine check on ultimate power that has
been obscured by American practice: "[Parliament] hath sovereign
and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding [all]
laws..., this being the place where that absolute despotic power,
which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by
the constitution of these kingdoms."" To sanction an appeal from
sovereign authority, including one to the judiciary, would be to
promote anarchy. It would "set the judicial power above that of
the legislature, which would be subversive of all government."32
Blackstone left no doubt about legislative omnipotence by
illustrating with the hypothetical example of a law making a man
judge of his own cause. This was, by existing standards, a
concededly unreasonable act, but Blackstone concluded:
[Ihf we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact that [a
man] should try as well his own causes as those of other persons,
there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the
legislature, when couched in such evident and express words as
leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature or no. 33
In the aftermath of a successful revolution against
monarchical power it was hard to quarrel with locating ultimate
power in parliament. Confidence in legislative omnipotence was
reinforced by the composition of the English parliament, which in
its inclusion of Commons, Lords, and Monarch was itself a system
of checks and balances among the major social and political forces.
Americans were the beneficiaries of both the English and
American revolutions.
In the aftermath of the American
revolution power also flowed to legislatures. Unlike the case in
England exercise of this power in the American states provoked
concern for the preservation of limited government. Anxiety was
fueled by anti-loyalist and debtor relief legislation and by denial of

31.

1

SIR

WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

ON

THE

ENGLAND 160 (Harper and Brothers from the 21't London ed., 1954).
32. Id. at 91.
33. Id.

LAws

OF
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trial by jury in cases touching vested rights. In this setting of
revolutionary instability and untested, wholly republican
legislatures, there was significant interest in enlisting the
judiciary in support of limited government. To legitimate a
judicial check it was necessary to answer Blackstone's objections.
The successful response to Blackstone was made by James
Iredell, and published in 1786 in a North Carolina newspaper
under the title "To the Public."' He repeated this argument in
1787 in a letter to Richard Spaght,"5 then serving as a delegate
from North Carolina to the Constitutional Convention. It rested in
the existence of a written constitution in contrast to England's
unwritten one. This Constitution, Iredell argued, bound the
legislature literally, the way an unwritten constitution admittedly
could not. It was, he insisted, supreme binding law, but the
binding quality of American constitutions inhered in explicit limit
on government itself, not in any quality as supreme ordinary law.
Explicit written constitutions did not, as they could not, challenge
the difference in kind between fundamental law and ordinary law,
with its attendant differences in enforcement and finality of
interpretation. However, they did make it possible to say, as it
was impossible to say in England, that an unconstitutional act was
void. This formulation, moreover, carried the meaning that a
concededly unconstitutional act was void. It was the first of
Iredell's two-step defense of judicial refusal to enforce an
unconstitutional act that was to make its way into Marbury. The
second was that judges, in meeting their responsibility to expound,
or to say what the ordinary law is, could not enforce that which, in
its violation of the constitution, was void or not law. This
argument presumed no judicial authority to expound the
constitution authoritatively or to say what the law of the
constitution is. Rather it grew out of the judiciary's unique
responsibility to expound, or to say what the ordinary law is, and
its authority in common with the other branches to "regard," or
"not close its eyes to" explicit American fundamental law.
Assertion of this latter authority was in direct response to
Americans who, following Blackstone, argued that the
Constitution was a law to the legislature only. Judicial authority
to regard the Constitution was an expression of the equality of the
branches under explicit fundamental law in contrast to the
legislative omnipotence of England and to the judicial supremacy
of modern constitutional law. Absence of any judicial claim to
expound the Constitution authoritatively in the initial argument
was reflected in the repeated invocation of and compliance with
the rule that judges should not refuse to enforce an act unless

34. MCREE, supra note 24, at 145-49.
35. Id. at 172.
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there was no doubt about its unconstitutionality. 6
The concededly unconstitutional act is trivial and irrelevant
to the experience of American constitutional law, but in the years
following independence was at the center of theoretical and
practical concern. Theoretically, as we have seen, establishing the
invalidity of a concededly unconstitutional act joined the argument
as Blackstone posed it in his defense of legislative omnipotence.
Practically, the concededly unconstitutional act addressed the
fears generated by the legislative irresponsibility of the
revolutionary era. Limited government itself, and protection of
vested rights in particular, was thought to be imperiled. From
hindsight it is also easy to dismiss this fear as excessive.
However, from the perspective of the participants the record of
state legislatures threatened the achievements of the revolution.
Three points about this consensus of the 1790s are crucial for
understanding subsequent developments.
The first is its
subordination of the written to the explicit Constitution, as
reflected in all the formulations of Iredell's argument other than
Marbury. The three leading ones-Iredell's "To the Public",
Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78, and in The Works of James
Wilson-made no mention whatever of the written Constitution.
Iredell traced judicial authority to the Constitution's status as a
"fundamental" and "unalterable [law of the State] ;,,37
Wilson to its
status as "supreme" law; 8 and Hamilton to a "limited"
Constitution. 9 Joseph Story, writing in 1833, identified The
Federalist No. 78 as the best statement of judicial authority to
refuse to enforce an unconstitutional act, and located it in the
"general theory of a limited constitution."40
36. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (demonstrating

Iredell's acceptance of the doubtful case rule); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1
Va. Cas.) 20, 77 (1793) (rejecting the claim that the Constitution was a rule to

the legislature only); SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 46-52 (analyzing Iredell's
argument); SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 60-62 (reviewing Supreme Court
compliance with the doubtful case rule before Marbury).
37. MCREE, supra note 24, at 148. Iredell referred to the written

Constitution in the formulation of his argument in his letter to Spaight. See
id. at 172. Alfange pointed to Iredell's reference to the Constitution as "a law
of the State" as evidence he understood judicial review to be a legal rather

than political act. Alfange, supra note 21, at 340. However, my argument
does not depend on whether the founding generation referred to the
Constitution as law, but on whether I have properly identified what they
understood the attributes of that law to be. Neither does it require, as Alfange
thinks necessary, any open acknowledgment by judges overturning legislation
that they are performing a political act. Id. at 339. It is precisely the overlap
in terminology between the original and modern defenses of judicial review

that has obscured the original distinctions and understanding.
38. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 26, at 329.
39. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 100.
40. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1583, 1576 N.2 (Charles C. Little & James Brown, 2d ed. 1851)
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Early defenses of judicial authority over legislation that did
mention the written Constitution underscore its significance as a
vehicle for the explicitness of limited government. In Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance William Patterson argued: "in England there is
no written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible,
nothing real, nothing certain, by which a statute can be tested. In
America... [elvery State in the union has its constitution reduced
to written exactitude and precision."4' Iredell's letter to Spaight
pointed out that "the Constitution [is] not.., a mere imaginary
thing, about which ten thousand different opinions may be formed,
but a written document to which all may have recourse...." Saint
George Tucker argued that opposition to a judicial check on
legislation was unsustainable in the presence of a written
constitution which had a "real existence," whose "principles can be
ascertained from the living letter, not from obscure reasoning or
deductions only." 3
Second, derivation of judicial authority over unconstitutional
acts from explicit fundamental law left unresolved the precise
content of judicially enforceable binding fundamental law.
Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell conducted the most
famous debate on this point in Calder v. Bull. Chase maintained
that in a government "established on express compact, and on
republican principles," judges could refuse to enforce an act
"contrary to the great first principles of the social compact ... "
Iredell denied this authority, arguing that the "ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no fixed standard, [and] the ablest and
purest men have differed upon the subject .... ," However, acts
that violated the "marked and settled boundaries" of legislative
power "define[d] with precision" in the American constitutions
were "unquestionably void," and judges could rightly refuse to
enforce them.46
The Chase-Iredell debate was over what constituted the
explicitness of American fundamental law, not one between
contending modes of interpreting supreme, ordinary law. For
Chase the decisive explicitness inhered in the "express" character
of American compacts in contrast to the fictional or imaginary
ones of other regimes. Express American compacts were the
product of its particular revolutionary experience. As one against
a colonial power, the American Revolution had broken completely
from the previous regime leaving its citizens in the approximation

(1833).

41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795).
42. MCREE, supra note 24, at 174.
43. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (1793).
44. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).

45. Id. at 399.
46. Id.
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of a real state of nature. Saint George Tucker articulated the
significance of these circumstances in the course of defending the
binding character of Virginia's written constitution, despite the
fact that it had been framed by a convention not appointed for this
purpose, that other actions of the same body were conceded to be
ordinary law, and that
the constitution had not been
47
extraordinarily ratified:
There was at least the shadow of legal, constitutional authority in
the convention parliament of England in 1688, as the ordinary
legislature; and the national assembly of France was
constitutionally assembled under the authority of the government it
subverted. The convention of Virginia had not the shadow of a
legal, or constitutional form about it. It derived its existence and
authority from a higher source; a power which can supersede all
law ...

namely the people, in their sovereign, unlimited, and

unlimitable authority and capacity.48
The act of taking Virginia out of a "state of nature,"49 Tucker
and his fellow judges insisted, was the crucial consideration in
making Virginia's constitution supreme, binding law.50 Whatever
its procedural defects, the force of circumstances reconstituting
government in the aftermath of a complete rupture made it an
express compact, and this status enabled it to bind subsequent
legislatures the way the products of the ordinary revolutionary
parliaments of Europe could not. American circumstances,
moreover, gave all the states express compacts, all of which rested
in republican principles and limited government. Chase was not
wrong in locating their content in the wide and deep consensus on
the "great first principles of the social compact,"" but neither was
Iredell in pointing out that the consensus was not total. Express
compacts, nevertheless, constituted the deepest source of binding
fundamental law: they made possible the idea of an
unconstitutional act, and thereby of judicial authority over such an
act. Express compacts supported the initial openness to judicial
invalidation of legislation even in the absence of an extraordinarily
adopted constitution, as in Virginia, and in the absence of any

47. Kamper, 3 Va. at 27-28, 36-37, 46-47, 57-58 (1793) (discussing the
defects of the Virginia constitution as binding law).

48. Id. at 74.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id. at 27-28, 36-37, 46-47, 57-58.

The judges also pointed to the

Constitution's subject matter and to its subsequent popular acceptance as a
constitution. See id. at 27-28, 37-38, 46-48, 57-58, 69-74.
51. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388; Chase's examples of laws that
violated these principles were those that "punished a citizen for an innocent
action[,] ... that destroys... lawful private contracts[,] ... that makes a man
a Judge in his own cause or ... that takes property from A. and gives it to B."

52. Id. at 399.
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post-colonial constitution, as in Rhode Island." As extraordinarily
adopted written constitutions became the norm they were
increasingly invoked to establish the reality, precision, visibility,
and explicitness of the limits of American fundamental law, and
were routinely referred to as supreme, binding law. But the
primacy of express compacts explains the dominance of Chase's
position well into the nineteenth-century. 4 Marshall's successful
textualization of the Constitution was not the vindication of Iredell
over Chase but the transformation of both.
Third, whether as "the great first principles of the social
compact," or the "marked and settled boundaries" of the written
Constitution, constitutional limits were general principles, whose
force and meaning were subject to expansion, qualification, and
adaptation, as were the grants of power so characterized in
McCulloch. In McCulloch the central property of the grants was
their prospect for adaptation, rendering them virtually
contentless.
The 1790s defense of judicial authority over
legislation focused exclusively on constitutional limits and on their
core meaning fashioned from long political struggle and extensive
common law development. It was only this established meaning
and existing law that judges could enforce against conceded
violation. Beyond this, adaptation of constitutional limits was
understood to be a legislative responsibility. That is the meaning
of the doubtful case rule.
III. THE CONTRACT

CLAUSE CASES

Transformation of the principled limits on government into
written, legal text took place in Marshall's Contract Clause
opinions, the main limit on power enforced against legislation in
the initial practice of judicial review.
It was achieved in the
doing with no acknowledgment or discussion. The process is
visible only through comparison of Marshall's opinions with those
of his colleagues.
Marshall fixed the meaning of the clause

53. At independence, Rhode Island amended its colonial charter without

making new fundamental law. Rhode Island also produced one of the leading
instances of judicial refusal to enforce legislation under the Articles of
Confederation. The case, Trevett v. Weeden, is best known through a pamphlet
written by the defendant's lawyer. See James M. Varnum, "The Case Trevett
against Weeden," microprint in Charles Evans' American Bibliography no.
20825 (American Antiquarian Society). See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 27-30
(discussing the connection between the American revolutionary experience
and judicial authority over legislation).
54. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional
Law, 12 MICH L.REV. 247, 249 (1914) (noting the dominance of Chase's
position). See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
55. The only other limit so enforced was the prohibition on the states from
emitting bills of credit in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Craig v. Missouri,
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
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through textual exposition while his colleagues relied exclusively
on extra-textual sources, either natural law principle or common
law precedent on the law of contracts. It is important to stress
that use of textual exposition to determine constitutional meaning
was not itself innovative. The decisive innovation was judicial
reliance on an arguable exposition to fix the meaning of the
Constitution for the purpose of enforcing it against legislation.
This made the judiciary the authoritative expounder of
constitutional text, attaching, in the process, the judicial
responsibility in ordinary law to the Constitution and obscuring
the difference in kind between them.56
Marshall's innovations did not go unchallenged but their
precise character and full import went unrecognized, then as now.
At the time he made them their novelty was concealed by the
degree to which his practices conformed to existing expectations.
This pattern is visible first in Marbury. Nothing in Marshall's
defense of judicial authority to refuse to enforce an
unconstitutional act challenged the self-understanding of the
1790s. It differed only in emphasis, one too slight to have caused
notice but too artful to be accidental. Marbury, for one thing,
followed the form of the existing two-part defense of judicial
authority over unconstitutional legislation: the first defended the
proposition that an unconstitutional act is void, and the second
judicial refusal to enforce such a concededly unconstitutional act.
The argument is illustrated with hypothetical examples of clear
constitutional violations.
Next, judicial authority over
unconstitutional acts is said to follow from its authority to
expound ordinary law.
Marbury makes this point in the
paragraph beginning "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of

56. I stress this point because it is another the significance of which
Alfange missed. In Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution I argued
that 1790s judicial review acknowledged the absence of judicial authority to
expound the Constitution authoritatively and that the doubtful case rule
reflected this understanding. SNOWISS, supra note 18. Alfange understood

me to claim that the doubtful case rule denied any judicial authority to
expound the Constitution. Alfange, supra note 21, at 342. He countered his

formulation of my position with cases in which Supreme Court Justices
invoked the rule and expounded constitutional text. Id. at 342-44. As these
were all cases in which the Court upheld challenged legislation, they support

rather than invalidate the claim I did make. After making the initial
argument I did not use the word "authoritatively" in every reference to this
point. Alfange cited one such reference in setting out his formulation of my
position. Id. at 342. However, the absence of judicial authority to expound the

Constitution authoritatively is central to the difference in kind between
fundamental law and ordinary law delineated in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, is spelled out fully in the first formulation of the
argument, and is reiterated in later contexts. SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 4951, 125, 173.
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the judicial department to say what the law is."57 The word law
here refers to ordinary law and no one in 1803 would have read it
any differently. This argument repeats Iredell's in "To the Public,"
that judicial responsibility to expound and interpret, or say what
the ordinary law is, precluded enforcement of an act that, in its
conceded unconstitutionality, is void or not law." The conflict of
laws analogy used to support this judicial authority is also taken
directly from Iredell and others. In its original form it served only
as precedent for judicial refusal to execute some duly enacted
legislation.59
Marbury's departure from the 1790s consensus consists in its
many references to the written Constitution. Marshall started, as
had the earlier formulations, with the limited Constitution. The
American Constitution, he pointed out, not only organizes and
empowers government but "establish[es] certain limits" on the
branches or "departments" that it created, "and that those limits
may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."6 °
This is a totally innocuous remark then and now.
It also
maintains the original significance of the written Constitution as
explicit fundamental law. In the rest of the opinion he mentioned
the written Constitution nine times. I have found only ten
references to the written Constitution in all the previous defenses
of judicial authority over unconstitutional acts combined, and
there are no such references in the leading ones."' Five of the ten
are in Patterson's opinion in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance where,
as elsewhere, the status of the written Constitution as a vehicle for
the explicitness of fundamental law is clearly stated.62 One of
Marbury's references invokes the "theory... essentially attached
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
58. Ultimately, Alfange never indicated what is wrong with my core
reinterpretation of Marbury as a response to Blackstone's defense of
legislative omnipotence. He addressed this question twice, first in connection
with Marshall's formulation in Marbury, and again with respect to Tucker's in
Kamper v. Hawkins. His discussion of Marbury is rendered useless by his
incorrect assumption that the original understanding required overt
discussion of judicial review as a political act. See Alfange, supra note 21, at
338. In discussing Tucker's formulation Alfange says that "perhaps" my
reading (which Alfange did not summarize accurately) is correct. But he

nevertheless concluded, without argument, that the conventional modern
reading was "more likely." Id. at 341. It is only familiarity that makes it seem
so, despite the near universal agreement shared by Alfange, that the defense
of judicial review in this modern reading is illogical. Id. at 422.
59. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 31-32 (1793) (stating the
original meaning most clearly). MOREE, supra note 24 at 172-73); HAMILTON,
supra note 25; THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 26, at 328.

60. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 176 (1803).
61. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; SNOWISS, supra note 18,

at 113 n.17 (citing to cases mentioning the written Constitution in 1790s
defenses of judicial review).
62. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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to a written constitution." On examination, this theory turns out
to be "that an act ...repugnant to the constitution, is void."68 This

is the central, and powerful, theory of eighteenth-century judicial
review, but is too trivial to sustain the modern practice. Its
defense connects Marbury's emphasis on the written Constitution
to a different theory, that commitment to writing made the
Constitution supreme ordinary law subject as is that law to
authoritative judicial application and interpretation. There is
universal agreement that this is not a particularly good theory but
it is the best one we have to justify the legalization of the
Constitution that had already taken place.
Marbury's second departure from existing formulations is not
so much a departure as a precursor of the innovations to come. It
is the observation that "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule," inserted
after the declaration that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."" This is
the closest Marbury came to claiming judicial authority to expound
the Constitution authoritatively, a reading made possible by use of
the comprehensive term "rule" instead of "law," and by the modern
assumption that the Constitution is included within the words law
and rule. However, this reading, according to another staple of
modern criticism, assumes what has to be proven, that the
province and duty of the judicial department includes
authoritative exposition of the law of the Constitution. In 1803
such a claim would have been totally insupportable, as the
doubtful case rule indicates. Even today, while we accept this
exposition in practice, its legitimacy has yet to be established on
anything but historical grounds. This provocative second sentence
is, however, a forerunner of Marshall's subsequent exposition of
Contract Clause text in the course of invalidating legislation. In
1803 it was unexceptional, if unnecessary, verbiage that did not
challenge the central claim of the 1790s consensus, repeated in
Marbury, that American courts could "regard" or not "close their
eyes on the constitution."65
Marshall's Contract Clause opinions, similarly, could be
accommodated within existing expectations although not as easily
as was Marbury. In each Marshall extended the Constitution's
prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts to
circumstances not explicitly identified in its text, but not
prohibited by it. His primary reliance was on text, reinforced by
the suggestion that the reading he was giving it was compatible
with the framers' intent. In Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall concluded

63. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 178-79.
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that he could find no motive for the framers' "implying, in words
which import a general prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts, an exception in favor of the right to impair the
obligation of those contracts into which the State may enter."66 In
Dartmouth College v. Woodward Marshall granted that the rights
of the parties to the charter, or contract, at issue in this case were
not "particularly in the view" of the framers of the clause.
However, he insisted that the general words of the Contract
Clause could not exclude its application to this circumstance
"unless there be something in the literal construction so obviously
absurd, or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the
instrument, as to justify those who expound the Constitution in
making it an exception." 7 In response to the contention, repeated
in his opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield, that "the mind of the
Convention was [not] directed" to the bankruptcy law now under
review, Marshall argued:
[If, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted
by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded,
because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend
what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of
applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all
mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the
application.68
As we know, he never found anything absurd, unjust, or
mischievous enough to defeat what he called the literal
construction and plain meaning of constitutional text.
One of the more striking aspects of Marshall's Contract
Clause opinions is the extent of discussion generated by such
spare text. Space does not permit reproducing these discussions
here, but it is necessary to read them in their entirety to get the
full flavor of their textual reliance. Also, it is necessary to
compare Marshall's opinions with those of his colleagues to
appreciate the innovativeness of this textual reliance. There were
five opinions in which Justices other than Marshall supported
overturning legislation considered under the Contract Clause:
William Johnson's concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck;69 Story's
opinion for the Court in Terrett v. Taylor and his concurrence in
Dartmouth v. Woodward;" Bushrod Washington's concurrence in

66. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
67. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644, 645

(1819).
68. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819). See SNOWISS, supra note 18, ch.
5, (discussing Contract Clause cases).
69. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
70. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 43 (1815); Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at

666.
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Dartmouth v. Woodward 71 and his opinion for the Court in Green v.
Biddle. 7' None used textual exposition to establish the meaning of
the Constitution and the consequent invalidity of the legislation.
Johnson's Fletcher concurrence is probably the best known of these
opinions. Its holding rested on "a general principle, on the reason
and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on
the Deity."73 This principle was vested rights. Equally important,
Johnson denied that the legislation constituted a violation of the
contracts clause. Although he did not object to inclusion of public
contracts within the operation of the clause, he expressed concern
74
over application and interpretation of the word "obligation."
Story's opinion in Terrett v. Taylor overturned an act of the
Virginia legislature that claimed lands held by the Episcopal
Church and previously confirmed to it by legislation that had
accompanied disestablishment. 5
It concluded "and we think
ourselves standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the
fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and
the letter of the constitution of the United States, and upon the
decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals. ..."
Story did
not identify the "letter" of the Constitution violated by this
legislation.
This same indirect treatment of constitutional text is visible
77
in Story's concurring opinion in Dartmouth.
In the course of
answering whether a charter incorporating a private charity
dedicated to public purposes was a contract within the meaning of
the Contract Clause, Story noted that "the constitution ...did not
mean to create any new obligations ....[O]n the other hand...
the constitution did intend to preserve all the obligatory force of
contracts, which they have by the general principles of law."78 He
then continued the exhaustive discussion of common law
precedents on the law of contracts, with which he had opened his
opinion, to demonstrate that the Dartmouth charter was protected
by the Constitution."
The leading precedent was Phillips v.
Bury,8" an English case which held that a private charity, although
dedicated to general public purposes, was nevertheless private.81

71. 17 U.S. at 654.
72. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).

73. 10 U.S. at 143.
74. Id. at 144-45.
75. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
76. Id. at 52.
77. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
78. Id. at 683.
79. Id. at 683-712.
80. Skin. 447 (1695).
81. Id. at 670. Justice Marshall's references to common law precedent in
Dartmouth were as minimal and indirect as were Justice Story's references to
constitutional text. Id. at 633-34.
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Washington's concurrence also relied on Phillips v. Bury.82
Washington's opinion in Green v. Biddle held legislation passed by
Kentucky to compensate settlers for improvements made to land to
which they did not have title, and from which they were
subsequently ejected, to have violated a compact between Virginia
and Kentucky entered into on the separation of Kentucky from
Virginia. 3 It was by virtue of this violation of the compact,
determined by examination of common law, that the Kentucky law
was held to have violated the Constitution. There were only
passing references to the Contracts Clause in this opinion and no
exposition of its text."4
Opinions sustaining legislation that Marshall held to be
unconstitutional contain additional evidence of the novelty of the
Chief Justice's reliance
on authoritative
exposition of
constitutional text. In the face of ambiguous text other Justices
invoked the doubtful case rule 5 and examined the text in light of
the "universal understanding of the American people" at the time
of the framing."
Johnson's opinion in Ogden v. Saunders,
upholding a prospectively operating bankruptcy law, indicated
that the unanimity of Sturges, decided eight years earlier, and
overturning a bankruptcy law applied to a contract entered into
before passage of the act, was "as much ...a compromise, as ... a
legal adjudication." 7
The Sturges minority, Johnson noted,
accepted Marshall's determination as it "could do no harm, but, in
fact, imposed a restriction conceived in the true spirit of the
Constitution."8 This was hostility to retrospective legislation.
Johnson's Ogden opinion also criticized Marshall's textualism
directly, observing that the Constitution should be interpreted in
terms of its "general intent" without "subjecting it to a severe
literal construction, which would be better adapted to special
pleadings." 8
Johnson's comment on Sturges lays bare the overlap of
principle and text that shielded Marshall's innovations in the
Contract Clause cases.9" While Marshall was expounding text his

82.
83.
84.
claim

See id. at 665 (citing Phillips v. Bury, Skin. 447 (1695)).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
Id. at 74-85. Washington also relied on Fletcher v. Peck to counter the
that a compact between two states was not a contract within the

meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 92.
85. See Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 444, 458-59 (1830) (reflecting

the opinions of Justices Johnson and McLean respectively); Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270, 294 (1827) (reflecting the opinions of
Justices Washington, Smith and Thompson respectively).
86. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. at 277.
87. Id. at 213; Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
88. Ogden, 25 U.S. at 272-73.

89. Id. at 286.
90. Id. at 272-73.
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fellow Justices were defending the "principles of natural justice,"9
"the general principles of law,"92 and the "true spirit of the
constitution."93 Marshall acknowledged this overlap in Fletcher v.
Peck, concluding that the legislation was void "either by general
principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the
particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States."94
He also addressed the relationship between the spirit and the
words of the Constitution, at the heart of his textualization of
principle, in one passage in his Sturges' opinion.9 Here he raised
and rejected a defense of bankruptcy laws, grounded in the
contention that while such laws could be said to be "within the
very words of the constitution," they were not "within its spirit."9"
Marshall prefaced his reply with the observation that "the spirit of
an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not
less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its
words." 97 This procedure is the inversion of an otherwise uniform
practice. No other Justice thought exposition of words appropriate
for fixing the meaning of the Constitution over a contrary
legislative interpretation.
Legalization of principle, as indicated above, was the
consequence not simply of its subjection to textual exposition, but
to authoritative judicial exposition in cases of doubt.
This
departure from existing expectations was obscured by the
compatibility of Marshall's results with the requirements of the
doubtful case rule. This is clearest in Fletcher v. Peck." There
could be no stronger compliance with the rule than that
manifested in Johnson's concurrence: the act was void for violation
of a principle that would "impose laws even on the Deity."99 As the
rest of Johnson's opinion indicates, however, for him this same
holding was a doubtful reading of text.'0
The holding in
Dartmouth also passed the doubtful case rule: for Marshall's
colleagues there was no doubt what common law precedent
required. 0 ' Dartmouth's status as a doubtful reading of text is
91. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810); Terret v. Taylor,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
92. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 654, 683,
(1819); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 74-85 (1823).
93. See Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 272-73 (1827)
(characterizing the basis of the unanimous result in Sturges v. Crowinshield,
17 U.S. 122 (1819)).
94. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 139.
95. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
96. Id. at 202.
97. Id.
98. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143.
99. Id. at 143

100. Id. at 143-45.
101. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 669-70, 683-

708 (1819).
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reflected in the contraction of its precedential force in Charles
River Bridge."2 As noted above, while the holding in Sturges v.
Crowinshield reflected the true spirit of the Constitution, it was
simultaneously an arguable reading of text."3 Marshall, moreover,
never criticized the doubtful case rule openly, and on two occasions
explicitly reaffirmed it. He did so in Fletcherv. Peck, in the course
of upholding a statute whose validity no one doubted,' 4 and again
in Dartmouth.'°
Marshall's capacity to confound principle and text and to
maintain some kind of compliance with the doubtful case rule was
facilitated by confinement of judicial invalidation of legislation,
outside the federalism cases and concurrent review, to the
Contract Clause.
Contract Clause purposes were a central
component of the principle of vested rights and of limited
government, per se, and laws that impaired the obligation of
contracts were widely referred to as "contrary to the first
principles of the social compact."" 6 Story's chapter on the Contract
Clause in his Commentaries ended by asserting the invalidity of
an act that violated the principle of vested rights even in the
absence of a textual prohibition:
Whether... independently of the constitution of the United States,
the nature of republican and free governments does not necessarily
impose some restraints upon the legislative power, has been much
discussed. It seems to be the general opinion, fortified by a strong
current of judicial opinion, that, since the American revolution, no
state government can be presumed to possess the transcendental
sovereignty, to take away vested rights of property... by a mere
legislative act.'0 7
When this passage is read together with Story's opinions in
Terrett v. Taylor and Dartmouth v. Woodward it is an open
question whether he understood Marshall's to rest, essentially, in
textual exposition s If we could imagine a judicial review
operating today limited to application of the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech, and dedicated to expanding the
force of its protections, in which some Justices stressed the
fundamentality of the right and others concentrated on
102. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
103. Sturges v. Crowinshield 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
104. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 128.
105. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 625.
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). See also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
107. Supra note 40, § 1399. Story's reference to the American revolution is
additional evidence of the centrality of this experience in ending legislative
omnipotence and making possible the existence of an unconstitutional act. See
supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
108. Terret, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
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applicability of its text to circumstances not immediately in the

mind of the framers, we could see how easy it would be to confound
principle and text and to participate in stretching the doubtful
case rule without seeing it as being violated.
Lastly, textualization and legalization of principle were
facilitated by the abandonment of seriatim opinion-writing, a
decision made in response to Marshall's urging."°9 This gave the
Chief Justice a virtual monopoly that he exploited masterfully.
From today's perspective Marshall's exposition of text appears so
commonplace as hardly to draw attention. His opinions make
those of Johnson in Fletcher,"' Story in Terrett and Dartmouth,"'
and Washington in Dartmouth and Green"' seem anomalous,
vestiges of a bygone alternative whose theoretical integrity is no
longer accessible. However, it is, in fact, Marshall's opinions that
are anomalous. None of the eighteenth-century state court
precedents for judicial review rested in textual exposition"' and no
other Supreme Court Justice determined the unconstitutionality of
legislation on the basis of an arguable reading of text. Under
Marshall's leadership, recourse to first principles and existing
substantive law was marginalized as he insisted on collecting the
Constitution's spirit from its words, and as he applied what he
called the plain meaning of words and literal construction of text
to new circumstances.
This was the form followed in Roger Taney's invalidation of
the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott, the next major
"enforcement" of a constitutional limit after the Contract Clause."'
Today we say that the substantive reading of the due process
clause, as given in Dred Scott, is an extra-textual one."' But Dred
Scott expounded the word property in Fifth Amendment text and
the result was no more extra-textual than was Marshall's reading
of the Contract Clause."0 Both are authoritative readings of
arguable text that are best understood as judicial adaptation of
principle in violation of the doubtful case rule.
IV.

ENFORCING THE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM

Enforcement of the Constitution's principles of federalism,
109. See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST
DISSENTER 45-47, 168-89 (1954).
110. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
111. Terret, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 43; Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
112. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 518; Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
113. The only exception was Kamper v Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
Like Marbury, Kamper was an exercise of concurrent review that required
interpretation of constitutional provisions on judicial organization. See supra
note 30 and infra note 186.
114. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

115. Id.
116. Id.
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particularly the supremacy of national law, stood on different
ground from enforcement of its limits. Article VI made national
law supreme over state law and assigned responsibility for
maintaining this supremacy to the courts. It also designated the
Constitution as part of the supreme law of the land. "Together
with the Article III provision granting the federal judiciary
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, the
Supremacy Clause authorized the courts to overturn state laws
that conflicted with national legislation as well as the
The latter, in Story's
Constitution's limits on the states.
summary, prohibited three kinds of state action: that
"incompatible with the interests of the union," such as duties on
imports; with its "peace and safety," such as the declaration of
war; and with the "principles of good government," such as the
emission of paper money.117 This judicial authority replaced the
negative on state legislation that contravened the Articles of
Union that had been lodged in the national legislature early in the
Constitutional Convention under the Virginia Plan."' The judicial
check, Story concluded, was "thought... preferable" by the
convention, and was "by far the most acceptable to the states. " 119
As indicated by the Virginia Plan, enforcement of limits on
the state governments is not an intrinsically judicial
At the same time nothing precluded such
responsibility.
assignment in the Constitution. This decision contributed to
legalization of fundamental law, independently of Marshall's
actions. One important result was to make enforcement of the
Constitution's principles of federalism an exercise in the conflict of
laws. However, it was a complicated exercise that maintained the
understanding that although designated as the supreme law of the
land, the Constitution remained different in kind from ordinary
law. It came closest to functioning as supreme, ordinary law in
the relationship between national and state legislation. Here the
Supremacy Clause assigned to the judiciary the responsibility of
any judiciary, that of peaceful arbiter of societal conflict. Without
such an arbiter the union would likely dissolve and to fulfill this
function the arbiter was obliged to provide finality in doubtful
cases. Although it was possible for courts to provide finality by
deferring routinely to the congressional determination of
constitutionality implicit in its legislation, there is no evidence of
This would, for one thing, defeat the
such an expectation.
advantage gained by the states in replacing congressional with
117. STORY, supra note 40 at § 1641. The examples are Story's.
118. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 47 (Max Farrand,

ed., 1937). See also Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James
Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM.
& MARY Q. 215 (1976).
119. STORY, supra note 40, § 1641.
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judicial enforcement of the principles of federalism. Lodging this
responsibility in the courts not only left the initial determination
in a state institution, but by the structure of the judicial system,
allowed for, if not invited, argument on the constitutionality of
national legislation. The Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized
appeals to the Supreme Court where state courts denied a claim
based in national law, anticipated such a possibility.
The
federalism cases also presented no line comparable to that
between concededly unconstitutional acts and doubtful cases that
existed for constitutional limits.
Relevant constitutional
provisions lacked the pre-existing content of the limits, experience
of how they would work in practice, and consensus on what
constituted a violation. The doubtful case rule, significantly, was
never invoked in this context.
No comparable requirement of finality existed for the purpose
of enforcing the explicit limits on the states, particularly the
"principles of good government," the only ones actually to find
their way to the courts. Here the doubtful case rule was applicable
and was uniformly invoked. Marshall's colleagues relied on it
continually in the Contract Clause cases and even he gave it lip
service in the course of undermining it.
Story's Commentaries contain additional evidence that
enforcement of the principles of federalism and of the grants of
power implementing them, and of the principles of good
government and of constitutional limits generally, were initially
understood to be different enterprises, each legitimated in
different terms. 2 ° Story prefaced his detailed examination of the
individual provisions of the Constitution with discussion of three
"preliminary" issues: the nature of the Constitution, finality in
constitutional controversies, and the rules of constitutional
interpretation.' 21
This discussion was exclusively one of
federalism. The full title of the chapter addressing the first issue
was "Nature of the constitution-whether a compact."'
Here
Story denied that the Constitution was a compact, insisting that it
established a national government whose authority in particular
cases was not dependent on the consent of the states.... 12 The
next chapter was entitled "Who is the final Judge, or Interpreter,
in Constitutional Controversies." 24 The answer was the Supreme
Court, but the support for this answer was not the argument of
Marbury but the constitutional provisions implementing the
principles of American federalism: the Supremacy Clause and

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

STORY, supra note 40.
Id., Book III, chs. III, IV, and V, respectively.
Id. at ch. III passim.
Id. § 322 and Book III, ch. III, passim.
Id. at ch. IV.
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Article III's "arising under" Clause.'25 The alternative to judicial
resolution of constitutional controversies was not legislative but
state resolution, a position that Story argued was incompatible
with "preserv[ation of] the Constitution as a perpetual bond of
union. " "'
The last of these preliminary chapters was entitled "Rules of
Interpretation of the Constitution."'27 Story started by noting
applicability of Blackstone's rules of statutory interpretation to
"all instruments" including the U.S. Constitution. These instruct
judges to seek meaning "according to the sense of the terms, and
the intentions of the parties." Intentions, in turn, are to be
"gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the
effects and consequences, or the reason and spirit of the law."' 28
He then turned from these "elementary" rules to more "definite"
These were all rules
ones for construing the U.S. Constitution.'
for construing the powers of the national government in the
context of federalism. Story devoted greatest space to rejecting a
rule that the powers of the national government should be
"construed strictly, in all cases, where the antecedent rights of a
state may be drawn in question."'' He also considered whether
implied powers were among the grants of power' and whether
national power was exclusive or to be exercised concurrently with
The chapter ended with rules governing the
the states.' 2
Echoing Marshall in
construction of constitutional words.
McCulloch... Story concluded "we should never forget, that it is an
instrument of government we are to construe.... "" The "truest
exposition," Story continued, is that "which best harmonizes with
" 135
[the Constitution's] design, its objects, and its general structure.
This conclusion repeated a longer formulation of the same point
made earlier in the chapter that also drew on McCulloch's..6
discussion of the grants of power: "In construing the constitution of
the United States, we are, in the first instance, to consider, what
are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as apparent from
the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also

125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
126. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 376, 385; STORY, supra note 40, ch. IV.
127. STORY, supra note 40, at 134.
128. Id. § 181.
129. Id. § 404.
130. See Id. at § 410 and §§ 411-23 (quoting from 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 151 (Tucker ed.).
131. Id. §§ 433-34.
132. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 435-47.
133. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
134. STORY, supra note 40, § 455.
135. Id.
136. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
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viewed in its component parts."'37
Thirty-three chapters later, in one entitled "The JudiciaryPowers and Importance of," Story defended judicial authority to
declare unconstitutional laws "void and inoperative." 138 He
defended this authority with the argument of the 1790s and
reproduced FEDERALIST No. 78 and Marbury139 almost in their
entirety.' ° This argument and these sources were conspicuously
absent from his defense of the Supreme Court as the "final judge
in constitutional controversies." It was not a continuation or
repetition of this discussion of enforcement of the principles of
federalism but an addition to it directed at enforcement of
constitutional "prohibitions or limitations"14
and limited
government per se.
It was the now classic repudiation of
legislative omnipotence under explicit fundamental law.
"The power of interpreting the laws," Story indicated,
"involves necessarily the function to ascertain, whether they are
conformable to the constitution, or not; and if not so conformable,
to declare them void and inoperative."
In the 1790s
understanding, as we have seen, and as Story's grammatical
structure indicates, the power of interpreting the laws referred
exclusively to ordinary law, not the law of the Constitution.
Judicial ascertainment of their conformity to the Constitution was
made necessary by its responsibility to ordinary law, to preclude
executing an act that in its violation of the Constitution was void
or not law. Story continued the argument in these terms: judicial
authority over legislation was necessary to preclude a legislative
omnipotence "like that claimed for the British Parliament." Its
source was "the very theory of a republican constitution of
government,"14 3
and the "general theory of a limited
constitution."'" Story referred once to the written Constitution in
this context and this reference, together with his primary stress on
the limited Constitution, reflected the original significance of the
written Constitution as a vehicle for the explicitness of limited
government. Repeating the link Hamilton had made in The
Federalist No. 78 between judicial independence and its
responsibility for constitutional enforcement, Story argued that
independence was particularly important in republics that
"possess a written constitution, with defined powers and limited

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

STORY, supra note 40, § 405.
Id. at § 1576.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
STORY supra note 40, § 1576 nn. 1 and 2.
Id. at § 1576.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 1583.
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rights."

145

Story's defense of judicial enforcement of constitutional limits
was directed at those of both national and state power.'
This
indicates that even with the Supremacy and "arising under"
Clauses, judicial responsibility for maintaining constitutional
limits was distinct from its authority as "final Judge ... in

Constitutional Controversies" over the supremacy of national
legislation. Defense of limited government was to be carried out
where there were no controversies, where the established meaning
of the principles of limited government were enforced against
violation under the doubtful case rule.

V. INTERPRETING THE GRANTS OF POWER

Marshall's contribution to legalization of the grants of power
is less visible than to the limits as there were fewer opinions
overturning legislation written by other Justices. The leading case
was McCulloch v. Maryland, the occasion for Marshall's
characterization of the grants as general principles with a
"nature," "character," and "properties," different from those of
ordinary law."7 Contrast between a constitution and an ordinary
legal code, and characterization of constitutional provisions as
broad and open to adaptation, is not in itself controversial. It is
controversial today in the context of modern judicial review
because of the breadth of power it gives to judges. It was
controversial at the time of McCulloch as part of the unresolved
controversy over application of the principles of federalism
embodied in the American Constitution."" Strict construction,
under which Congress' enumerated powers were to be narrowly
read was the position of those for whom the public good was best
served by the states' retention of substantial power. Marshall's
insistence on the openness and adaptability of the grants
expressed a conception of federalism in which public well-being
depended on the capacity of the national government to meet the
responsibilities entrusted to it free of unwarranted claims made by
the states.149 "[Tihe question respecting the extent of the powers
actually granted," Marshall observed in McCulloch, "is perpetually
arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system
shall exist."6 ° This has shown itself to be the case, but the most
contentious aspect of the McCulloch constitution today is not its

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

STORY supra note 40, § 1610.
Id. at § 1576.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 405.
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relation to federalism but to judicial review.'
McCulloch's characterization of the grants as principles open
to adaptation was accompanied by the expectation that adaptation
was a legislative, not judicial, responsibility. It was part of an
effort to forestall future challenges to the exercise of national
power.
The grants were not, however, open to infinite
adaptation.'52 Congress, Marshall indicated, could not exercise
power prohibited to it."' Presumably this was a reference to the

Constitution's explicit prohibitions such as the denial of authority
to tax exports or to establish a religion. Marshall did not discuss
the nature or properties of these limits, and it was unlikely anyone
thought such a discussion necessary. To the extent the limits were
enforceable in court, it was to defend their core established content
under the doubtful case rule. To the extent the limits were also
principles of government to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs, this too was a legislative responsibility.
Despite Marshall's identification of the grants as principles he
treated them in important ways as courts treat ordinary legal text.
This is most visible in the contrast between his opinion for the
Court and Johnson's concurrence in Gibbons v. Ogden."" The
Court was unanimous in invalidating a state regulation held to
conflict with an exercise of national authority over commerce. The
main substantive difference between Marshall and Johnson was
whether the state regulation would be invalid had Congress not
legislated on the subject. Johnson held that it would be and
Marshall reserved judgment on this point. The more interesting
difference was how each determined the meaning of the Commerce
Clause.
Marshall continued the textualization of principle
characteristic of his Contract Clause opinions. The Commerce
Clause gives Congress power to "regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states." To determine the extent of
power actually granted Marshall expounded the word "among."
Although long, this exposition is worth reproducing:
The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing which is
among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the
States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but
may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended to say that
these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not
extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the
word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 316.
McCulloch 17 U.S. at 316.
Id. at 421.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824).
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commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not
one which would probably have been selected to indicate the
completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase
for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of
commerce to which the power was to be extended, would not have
been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
description.
The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the
subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce
of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem
to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States
generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the
general powers of the government.
The completely internal
commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the

State itself.155
This passage is remarkable, among other reasons, for the
extent of the verbiage extracted from the word "among." Johnson's
opinion, in contrast, engaged in no textual exposition, insisting
that the Constitution's language was "simple, classical [and]
precise."1 56 However, constitutional meaning did not come from
these words, but from the intent they expressed, and this was
determined by historical inquiry. After several pages chronicling
the dislocations of commerce under the Articles of Confederation
Johnson concluded that:
The history of the times will, therefore, sustain the opinion, that the
grant of power over commerce, if intended to be commensurate with
the evils existing, and the purpose of remedying those evils, could be
only commensurate with the power of the States over the subject.
And this opinion is supported by a very remarkable evidence of the
general understanding
of the whole American people, when the
1 57
grant was made.
It was only after so determining constitutional meaning from
intent that Johnson turned to its words: "And the plain and direct
import of the words of the grant, is consistent with this general
understanding."
This observation is the extent of Johnson's
textual analysis. It was followed by rejection of textual exposition
as a method for determining constitutional meaning in the context
of enforcement:
It is not material, in my view of the subject, to inquire whether the
article a or the should be prefixed to the word "power" [in the
commerce clause]. Either, or neither, will produce the same result:

155. Id. at 194-95.
156. Id. at 223.
157. Id. at 225-26.
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if either, it is clear that the article the would be the proper one,
since the next preceding grant of power is certainly exclusive, to wit:
"to borrow money on the credit of the United States." But mere
verbal criticism I reject!"
Johnson's rejection of "verbal criticism" is the same objection
he was to make three years later, and quoted above, in response to
Marshall's exposition of Contract Clause text."9
As in the
Contracts Clause cases Johnson's approach to the Constitution
was the exact converse of Marshall's.
Johnson moved from
constitutional intent to words, while Marshall reversed that order:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ
the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they
intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our
constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to
have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended
what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language,
there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given
power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was
given, especially when those objects are
expressed in the
16
instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. 0
This was Marshall's preface, in Gibbons, to determination of the
meaning of the Commerce Clause through exposition of
"commerce," "among," and "power." 1 '
The contrasting opinions in Gibbons make it easier to see
elements of legalization in McCulloch that are less obvious than in
Marshall's other opinions. Alone among his major discussions of
the grants or limits Marshall did not here collect constitutional
meaning from its words. McCulloch's determination that Congress
had broad implied powers was made by analysis of the
Constitution's objects, ends, and nature. The existence and scope
of these powers were "deduced from the nature of the
[Constitution's enumerated] objects... inferred from the nature
[and language] of the instrument,..."."6 2 and ascertained... by the
nature and terms of the [power] grant[ed]... ." 3
Textual
exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause, undertaken in
reply to that made by those denying the existence of implied
powers, was subordinate to inference and deduction from
constitutional ends, nature, and structure. By today's standards,
as for the textual exposition of the Contract and Commerce
Clauses, such inference and deduction seems too commonplace to
warrant attention. However, it becomes noteworthy in contrast to
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 226-27.
See Ogden, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188-89 (1824).
Id. at 189-222.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407.
Id. at 410.
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Johnson's recourse to an avowedly political decision-making
embodied in an extra-constitutional historical intent. Marshall
shared Johnson's nationalist version of intent but he did not rely
on it as the source of constitutional meaning. Rather that was
extracted methodically from sources internal to the Constitution,
much as lawyers and judges extract meaning from any legal
instrument.

VI. THE BACKGROUND ENVIRONMENT FOR LEGALIZATION
A variety of political and social conditions provided a
receptive environment for Marshall's deliberate legalization of
fundamental law. One, as suggested above, was the Constitution's
designation of the courts as arbiters of the controversies over
federalism in doubtful cases.
This made unexceptional
authoritative judicial interpretation of the grants of power and the
judicial refusal to enforce some duly enacted legislation. The
absence of pre-existing content for the grants also made
application to them of the methods for statutory interpretation
less striking and innovative than for the limits, although
Johnson's Gibbons opinion indicates that even here judicial
determination of constitutional meaning, in the context of
overturning legislation, was not routinely sought through such
means." The net result of the Supremacy Clause, nevertheless,
was generation of a discourse of constitutionality, starting with
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and an ongoing practice of
constitutional law more legal than was the judicial defense of
limited government as understood in the consensus of the 1790s.
Legalization was also fostered by the change in political
climate between the successful repudiation of legislative
omnipotence in the 1790s and the first Contract Clause case in the
Supreme Court. With the passing of the revolutionary era and the
success of the Constitution of 1787 fear that republican majorities
would not respect vested rights abated, but acceptance of a judicial
check on legislation outlived this fear. As a result, from Iredell's
successful rebuttal of Blackstone judicial authority over
unconstitutional acts was a disembodied power accepted without
significant dissent but not used. 6 ' In the process the political and
revolutionary quality of genuine constitutional violation and
enforcement receded from consciousness. With the exception of
164. Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1
165. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (noting both the

widespread acceptance of judicial authority to "declare an act of congress to be
unconstitutional" and the absence of Supreme Court adjudication "upon the
point"). See also James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 227
(1992) (noting that in the highly partisan congressional debate over repeal of
the Judiciary Act of 1801 a "clear majority" of those addressing the issue,
"including many Jeffersonians," accepted judicial authority over legislation).
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the legislation overturned in Fletcher v.Peck,166 that challenged in
the Contract Clause cases was neither the product of legislative
willfulness nor harbingers of legislative omnipotence. Even for
Fletcher, the circumstances that had given rise to the case were
long gone"' and the legislative excess associated with it no longer
a threat.
The Contract Clause cases after Fletcher were
characteristically modern, presenting arguable interpretations of
the Constitution, certainly if understood as text, and largely also
as principle.'68 Without Marshall's leadership it is by no means
certain any of them would have been found to violate the
Constitution. To the extent judicial resolution was perceived as
political, it was already political in the modern sense of requiring a
choice among competing legitimate values already made by the
legislature.'6 9
Both the original climate and the significance of its
disappearance were captured, unintentionally, in Judge John
Gibson's critique of judicial review in Eakin v. Raub, written in
1825.17° Gibson directed his main criticism at Marbury but
commented briefly on Patterson's formulation of the same
argument in Vanhorne's Lessee v Dorrance,'7 ' particularly
Patterson's hypothetical examples of constitutional violations,
such as denial of trial by jury, the franchise, and religious liberty.
Gibson dismissed these as irrelevant. In their magnitude they
constituted a "revolution[ary]... usurpation of the political rights
of the citizens" against which, Gibson agreed, a "citizen should
resist with pike and gun" and the "judge... with habeas corpus
and mandamus. It would be his duty, as a citizen, to throw
himself into the breach, and if it should be necessary, perish
there."'72 However, he concluded, this did not demonstrate that
the judiciary was a "peculiar organ, under the constitution, to
prevent legislative encroachment on the powers reserved by the
people."'73
166. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
167. Id. Fletcher resolved a controversy dating to the mid-1790s. At that
time the Georgia legislature had authorized large land grants in an action

associated with widespread bribery of its members. Id. at 87-127. A
subsequent legislature rescinded the original grant jeopardizing the title of
those who had purchased from the original grantees.

Id. In Fletcher the

Supreme Court invalidated the rescinding act and upheld the title of those
purchasers. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
169. See ALEXI DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 99 (J.P. Mayer,

ed. & George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1966). This is the sense of
political thought associated with Alexis deTocqueville's observation that in
America, important political questions are treated as legal ones. Id.
170. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343-58 (1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
171. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
172. Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 356.

173. Id. at 355. Gibson, like deTocqueville, saw the practice of the 1820s as
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Gibson's characterization of the judicial defense of principle
as jumping "into the breach" "with habeas corpus and mandamus"
aptly captured the character of late eighteenth-century judicial
review as an extraordinary political act in defense of first
principles.
But Gibson failed to appreciate how representative
Patterson's examples were and the extent to which they were an
accurate reflection of the self-understanding of the 1790s.
Tucker's formulation used the identical examples of denial of free
exercise of religion and trial by jury.'7 Iredell used hypothetical
examples of acts abolishing trial by jury and those passed after the
legislature

had

abrogated

established

elections,'1 6

and

he

expressed the same shared understanding when he called the
judicial power over legislation a "delicate and awful" power.171
Marshall also referred to judicial review as delicate1 78 but never as
awful. By 1825 it was, in any case, already unintelligible in these
terms, as Gibson's discussion indicates.
The third contributing factor to legalization of fundamental
law was the public receptivity to a strong judicial presence in the
political life of the country. This receptivity antedated Marshall's
innovations and continues to this day. It supported the initial
search for a judicial check on the excesses of revolutionary era
legislatures, contributed to the rapid acceptance of Iredell's
rejection of Blackstone's strictures on judicial authority, and
underlay the openness to Marshall's legalization of fundamental
law.
This same public and professional support sustains
constitutional law today in the face of the widespread recognition
that judicial resolution of doubtful constitutional cases outside the
need for an authoritative arbiter requires a value choice that is
appropriately legislative not judicial.
Finally, I am not arguing that the modern practice was the
inevitable consequence of Marshall's innovations or that he selfconsciously sought to create the institution as we have known it
since the end of the nineteenth-century. It is impossible to know
Marshall's specific purposes, but they may have been considerably
narrower. He directed legalization of principle to the two upon
political in the modern sense. He recognized the judicial inability to enforce a
constitution against genuine violation. Id. at 354. He also rejected the
authoritative judicial exposition of the Constitution short of such violation,
that he was then witnessing, on the ground that it was a legislative
responsibility. See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 177-83 (discussing Gibson

further).
174. Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 356.
175. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 79-81 (1793).
176. MCREE, supra note 24, at 174.
177. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798).
178. Dartmouth v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 625 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. 87, 128 (1810). In Ogden v. Saunders, Marshall used the phrase "delicate
and important." 25 U.S. 213, 332 (1827).
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which he considered the fate of the new regime to rest: a national
government able to pursue the public interest free of disabling and
unwarranted claims made in the name of the states, and sanctity
of contract. The latter was the principle of limited government
widely thought at the founding to be most in danger in a
republican regime. Legalization of principle moved responsibility
for its delineation and defense from the public sphere and the
political branches to the courts. This likely reflected Marshall's
greater confidence in an elite judiciary over a republican citizenry
and its representatives. 179 It was also likely an expression of
Marshall's self-confidence, as head of the judiciary in the crucial
formative period of nation building. Beyond this, replacement of
natural law principles with text-based positive law reinforced
these principles in crucial ways.
First, it extended their
application to circumstances not reachable by natural or common
law. Second, it brought to vested rights and sanctity of contract
the qualities of unthinking obedience and routine force associated
with ordinary law. Natural law restraints are in their nature
revolutionary and destabilizing, even when invoked in court. As a
positive law restraint, the Contract Clause was not only subject to
authoritative judicial exposition, but law itself became an
operative check on popular will. This ordinary legal check was not
contemplated in the original judicial refusal to enforce a
concededly unconstitutional act and was not part of the system of
checks and balances built into the Constitution. Its acceptance as
a regular restraint on democratic will is connected with being that
of law. To anticipate for a moment, by the beginning of the
twenty-first century this check is increasingly seen, for good
reason, as one of judges rather than law. I will return to this
central problem of constitutional law below. Here I want to stress
the origin of this check, and this problem, in Marshall's
unacknowledged legalization of fundamental law.
It is an open question whether Marshall contemplated the
modern institution in which courts routinely provide authoritative
interpretation of the entire constitutional text outside the doubtful
case rule and of a need to resolve particular conflicts between
national and state laws. I suspect that he did not because of the
magnitude of its departure from legal and republican norms and
because it was not crucial for the success of the new regime.
However, Marshall did provide the institutional forms of the
modern practice, without which I do not see how the constitutional
law we know could have come into being. Constitutional law
developed through institutional momentum within a favorable

179. See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1518 (1996) (giving a somewhat different explanation of the legalization of
fundamental law).
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environment.
It is one viable, if problematic, form of
constitutionalism whose problems are traceable to its peculiar
origin. Marshall's precise motivation is less important than
recognition of constitutional law's full novelty, and its origin in an
evolutionary process in the absence of internal theoretical
coherence.

VII. THE MODERN MARBURY
8

Dred Scott, ' decided in 1857, displayed the essential
components of modern constitutional law. The Court overturned
legislation on the basis of an arguable reading of constitutional
text, both a limit and a grant of power.18 1 Its substantive reading
of the property protected by the Due Process Clause drew on
existing ideas of property rights but it did not implement an extratextual consensus as had the Contract Clause opinions written by
Justices other than Marshall.
Also, its authoritative
interpretation of the grant of power was not necessary to
determine whether a state law was in conflict with a valid national
one. After the Civil War, this practice broadened to encompass
more regular invalidation of legislation under a wider range of
By the last decades of the nineteenth-century,
provisions.
legalization was complete as the Court "enforced" the Constitution
with a regularity approaching that of ordinary law enforcement.
This increased exertion of judicial authority over legislation
was accompanied by renewed public debate over its legitimacy.
Defense of judicial review drew on Marbury which, as Robert
Clinton has shown, had barely been invoked in this context until
this time. 182 However, by now the Marbury of 1803 was totally
inaccessible and the defense of judicial authority made in its name
was the modern one, linked to an understanding that the
Constitution was supreme, ordinary law. Most significantly, by
the end of the nineteenth-century, and undoubtedly earlier, this
modern conception had become the exclusive one, held even by
those who opposed the expansion of judicial power then taking
place. This is most clearly visible in the work of James Bradley
Thayer, is3 judicial review's most prominent late nineteenth180. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
181. Id. Dred Scott declared unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise
prohibiting slavery in the northern part of the Louisiana Territory. Id. The
court held that Congress' authority under Article IV to "make all needful

Rules and Regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States" was not applicable to territory acquired from a foreign
power after ratification, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment barred Congress from prohibiting slave owners from holding their
slaves in the territories. Id. at 432-44, 449-51.
182. CLINTON, supra note 19.
183. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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century critic. Even in the course of denigrating the logic of the
modern reading of Marbury Thayer accepted its core assumption,
that the judicial authority over legislation stems from the
Constitution's status as supreme, ordinary law. 84
Thayer's understanding is revealed in his discussion of the
consensus of the 1790s, which, in his words, rested "upon the very
simple ground that the legislature had only a delegated and
limited authority under the constitutions; that these restraints, in
order to be operative, must be regarded as so much law; and, as
being law, that they must be interpreted and applied by the
court." 8 ' The sources whose position Thayer was summarizing,
Iredell, Hamilton, Wilson, and Patterson, had linked judicial
authority over legislation to a limited constitution, but neither
they nor anyone else understood these limits to be "so much
law."8
As we have seen, as explicit fundamental law, the
Constitution was supreme, binding law, but it was not "so much
law."'87 It was law that the courts could "regard," or "take notice
of and apply against conceded violation and the assertion of
legislative omnipotence.
It was not the kind of law whose
application
required
or
allowed
authoritative
judicial
interpretation, and in making operative constitutional limits the
court functioned in an extraordinary political role, not a routine
legal one.
Thayer proceeded by identifying the central problem of the
legalized constitution, that its authoritative judicial interpretation
in all cases results in a judicial policy-making, or value choice, that
is legislative in character. He sought to confine this value choice
by resurrection of the doubtful case rule that accompanied the
framers' judicial review. Thayer's proposal attracted significant
support well into the twentieth-century, but by the early 1970s
was no longer seriously considered.
It failed because it is
incompatible with the regular practice that is modern
constitutional law and is incoherent for a constitution understood
as so much law.
The doubtful case rule is incompatible with a regular practice
because no regime could survive regular constitutional violation.
Faithfully followed, the rule culminates in the abandonment of
judicial review. Conversely, a practice so limited would be a
sporadic, irregular one, without the attributes of peaceful conflict
resolution associated with law. It would be some version of
Gibson's judge jumping into the breach with mandamus and
habeas corpus.'88 As we know, in the conflict between the rule and
184. Id.
185. Id. at 138.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. This attribute of genuine constitutional enforcement was visible in the
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the practice the rule has lost.
The doubtful case rule is incoherent for a constitution
understood as so much law because, as Gibson observed as he
witnessed the origins of the modern practice, the systematic
deference it requires, applied to the legalized constitution, is an
evasion of legal responsibility.'89 That it so operates is clear from
Justice Felix Frankfurter's constitutional law. His principled
deference to legislative interpretation of the Constitution in the
Flag Salute controversy... and in Dennis v. United States"' was
perceived as an evasion of legal responsibility, and this too
contributed to the demise of the rule.
For the founding generation, it is worth repeating here,
neither of these problems existed. Abandonment of judicial review
implicit in the doubtful case rule was a welcome indication of the
acceptance of established limits by republican legislatures. From
the adoption of the Constitution of 1787, until judicial review was
revived and reshaped by Marshall in the Contract Clause cases,
the practice was on the course of atrophy.'
Also, the doubtful
difficulties encountered in enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). In its challenge to the southern system of white supremacy,
Brown was the closest the Supreme Court has come to the willful, genuine
violation. Ending de jure school segregation was a protracted process that
ultimately required physical force, and would likely have failed without the
support of public opinion outside the South.
189. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serge. & Rawle 330, 352 (1825) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
190. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-600 (1940); West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
191. 341 US 494, 550-52 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
192. Marbury, as an instance of concurrent review in which the Court
interpreted that part of the Constitution governing its own operation, was not
by itself evidence of a revival of the judicial review defended in the consensus
of the 1790s.

Alfange objected that JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE

CONSTITUTION did not discuss Marbury's place in the political controversy of
the time, particularly that over repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. Alfange,
supra note 21, at 336. This objection is well taken. I assumed Marshall was
using Marbury's opportunity for concurrent review to establish a precedent for
authoritative textual exposition of the Constitution. However, if this were the
only explanation of Marbury, it does not account for the unanimity of the
opinion, particularly in light of its dubious interpretations of Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and of Article III. I had no explanation for the
unanimity. Confident in the strength of my overall argument I ignored the
issue. O'Fallon has given a highly credible explanation, that the Court, in
declaring Section 13 unconstitutional under an excessively restrictive reading
of Article III was protecting itself from possible further attack including
legislative "additions to the original jurisdiction designed to overwhelm the
Court with trivial cases." O'Fallon, supra, note 165, at 255. O'Fallon noted, in
this connection, that Marshall was likely aware of the conflict over judicial
organization between the Virginia legislature and judiciary during the 1780s
and 1790s in which judges articulated such fears. Id. note 125. O'Fallon did
not mention that this controversy ultimately produced Kamper v. Hawkins, 3
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case rule that accompanied its initial operation was not an evasion
of the judiciary's legal responsibility as the practice was no part of
that responsibility to begin with.
VIII.

PRINCIPLE AND TEXT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

As the modern practice unfolded the conflict between the
Marbury and McCulloch constitutions forced itself to the surface.
It was manifested first in connection with judicial determinations
that the Constitution prohibited extensive governmental
regulation of the economy. The McCulloch constitution was
explicitly invoked in 1934, in the majority opinion in Home Loan
Ass'n v.Blaisdell".. upholding a debt moratorium enacted by the
Minnesota legislature. In response to the argument made in
dissent that the moratorium violated Contract Clause text and
intent, Chief Justice Hughes offered Marshall's admonition "[w]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding,... a
constitution... to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. " 19 4 Contract Clause precedent, Hughes indicated, had long

recognized this necessity and had mitigated the provision's
restrictive force by requiring its application to consider public
needs. Under modern economic conditions, coupled with the great
depression, the clause did not prohibit a debt moratorium.9
Within a few years of Blaisdell the Court retreated from its
position that the Constitution precluded major governmental
regulation of the economy. It repudiated the limit of liberty of
contract that it had previously held to be part of the due process
9 6
clause and accepted Congress' adaptation of the grants of power.
As was the case for McCulloch itself, acceptance of legislative
adaptation of constitutional provisions submerged the conflict
between text and principle. Hughes' invocation of the McCulloch
constitution in Blaisdell was also at the service of sustaining
legislation, with the same consequences. However, McCulloch was
used in Blaisdell to give meaning to a limit on power, and this
anticipated a future sharper conflict between the Marbury and
McCulloch constitutions. 19'
This conflict was not to emerge for several decades.
Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793), another instance of concurrent review and the only
example of judicial invalidation of legislation based in textual exposition in
early judicial review. Alfange dismisses O'Fallon's account of Marbury
without considering this point. Alfange, supra note 21, at 379-85.
193. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
194. Id. at 443.
195. Id. at 439-43.

196. West Coast Hotel v Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
197. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-47.
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Immediately following acceptance of legislative adaptation of the
grants of power, judicial review occupied itself largely with
application and interpretation of constitutional limits. It held the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states,"' expanded the restrictive
force of key provisions, ' and made the Equal Protection Clause an
operative limit on state power."' For a while, these results could
be accommodated within the Marbury constitution. The selfconscious repudiation of substantive due process allowed Bill of
Rights adjudication to be understood as enforcement of
constitutional text.20 ' However, Brown v. Board of Education, the
most visible case of this era, could not be so accommodated. Here
the Court overruled a sixty year precedent and acknowledged that
the meaning it now gave to the Equal Protection Clause could not
be located in the traditional legal sources of text and intent. The

substantive

innovations

in

decisions

nationalizing

and

reinterpreting the Bill of Rights reinforced this observation that
was unavoidable in Brown.2 °2
This was the setting for the latest and fullest retrieval of the
McCulloch constitution, begun in 1962 by Alexander Bickel in The
Least Dangerous Branch. Bickel was motivated immediately to
find support for Brown,2 °2 and, more generally, for the practice of
198. See cases cited supra note 15.
199. See e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U..S. 88 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 US 624
(1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US 1 (1949).
200. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
201. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (defending judicial review in the aftermath of the New Deal court
The main defense was a process one, in which the judicial
crisis).
responsibility was to maintain the openness of the democratic process and to
protect "discrete and insular minorities" from majority prejudice. But the key
contemporary cases relied more on Carolene Products' link between judicial
authority over legislation and the "specific prohibitions" in constitutional text,
mentioned in its first paragraph. See Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
602-605 (1940) (Stone, J. dissenting) (arguing against the constitutionality of a
mandatory flag salute applied to Jehovah's Witnesses and stressing the
'specificity" of the First Amendment, the "explicit guarantees of freedom of
speech and religion" and the 'very terms" of the Bill of Rights); West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (overturning Gobitis,
and defending judicial responsibility to apply the "specific prohibitions of the
First (Amendment]"). Justice Stone did refer to the Jehovah's Witness' status
as a "discrete and insular" minority, but Jackson in Barnette did not. 310 U.S.
at 606.
202. See Grey, supra note 17.
203. References to Brown permeate THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH. See,
in particular, identification of the case as "the great judicial event of the
century," and racial segregation as the "single most important issue to come
before [the Supreme Court], in this century at least." BICKEL, supra note 2, at
63, 111.
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judicial review, which was institutionalized beyond removal but
which lacked satisfactory theoretical support.0 4 Bickel opened The
Least Dangerous Branch with an extended statement of the
standard critique of Marbury: that its defense of judicial authority
over legislation could not sustain the real practice in which judges
did not literally enforce the Constitution against violation but
overturned legislation in doubtful cases on the basis of judgments
that were legislative in character." 5 Bickel offered an alternate
conception of judicial review in which the judicial responsibility
was the "pronounce[ment] and guardian[ship]" of society's longterm principles and "enduring values."'
Implementation of
principle in particular cases looked to the past, following
traditional legal norms, but also required the "evolution of
principle in novel circumstances" and the "creative establishment
and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules ....

2

07

Without

invoking McCulloch explicitly, this formulation brought the limits
on power within its conception of constitutional provisions as
contentless principles open to adaptation to meet the various
crises of human affairs. To ask for more substance from
constitutional text and intent, Bickel argued at a later point in The
Least Dangerous Branch, was to "ask the wrong question" and to
guarantee "no answer."20 8

Moreover, unlike Blaisdell, judicial

adaptation of constitutional limits was now defended as the basis
for invalidation of legislation.
A year earlier Justice Harlan had made a comparable
argument in Poe v. Ullman 209 in the course of reviving the Due
Process Clause as a substantive limit on legislation. Ignoring
Marbury and citing McCulloch, Harlan characterized the
Constitution as "the basic charter of our society" which set out the
"principles of government" in "spare but meaningful" terms. This
meaning, he continued, was inaccessible through the "literalistic"
analysis used for a "tax statute"21 0 but was to be drawn instead
from constitutional purpose, history, and tradition. 21
As is
appropriate for a charter of government, this tradition was a
"living thing," which required consideration of those "traditions
from which [the country] developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke."212
A century and half of practice had
204. Id. at 1-14.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 24.
207. Id. at 25.
208. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 102. Bickel here cited McCulloch explicitly as
well as the exchange between Hughes and Sutherland in Blaisdell. Id. at 105-

06.
209. 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

210. Id. at 540.
211. Id. at 542-43.
212. Id. at 542.
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demonstrated, he indicated, that constitutional substance not so
grounded was not likely to endure.21 This was Harlan's sanction of
judicial recourse to contemporary values to fix the meaning of the
Constitution in the context of judicial invalidation of legislation.
Retrieval of the McCulloch constitution is neither an accident
nor a misapplication of its teaching. It is the direct consequence of
the inherent superficiality of the legalization of fundamental law
achieved by silent application to it of ordinary law technique, and
of the incapacity of the modern Marbury constitution to give a
coherent defense of judicial review or to account for its results.
Whatever the self-conception under which constitutional law has
been practiced, McCulloch provides the only tenable account of
Its provisions are
constitutional nature and functioning.
principles of government whose regular application and
interpretation can only be adaptation in terms of contemporary
values, whether done by legislatures or courts. Justice Scalia, the
McCulloch constitution's foremost critic, acknowledged its
inescapable force in noting that although it is only recently that
judicial reliance on contemporary values has been openly
defended, such reliance has long been practiced.214
The most serious defect of the Marbury constitution is not its
suggestion that the meaning of fundamental law can be
determined through exposition of text and intent, but its further
suggestion that the Constitution is to be enforced against
legislative violation as ordinary law is enforced against
individuals. As the founding generation understood, its vision not
obscured by subsequent legalization of the Constitution, ordinary
law's enforcement model is inapplicable to fundamental law. It is
not only, as we have seen, that courts lack the force necessary to
enforce the Constitution, which they do, but that constitutions are
a kind of law that cannot tolerate regular violation. Whereas
ordinary law contemplates violation, a constitution contemplates
compliance.
has
distorted
our
model
Marbury's enforcement
deeply
law
in
a
variety
of
of
constitutional
understanding
significant ways. Its identification of Supreme Court decisions
213. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.
214. Scalia, supra note 2, at 852. Scalia argued, at this point, that
McCulloch is improperly invoked to defend a constitution whose meaning
changes in light of contemporary values and needs. "The real implication" of
McCulloch, Scalia argued, is that "the constitution had to be interpreted
generously" through a "broad initial interpretation." Id. at 853. This is not an
incorrect reading of McCulloch in its original setting. However, it is also one

that contemplated ongoing legislative interpretation, or adaptation, of the
grants of power. It does not speak to modern constitutional law in which the
judiciary gives authoritative application and interpretation to the entire
constitutional text in circumstances short of the genuine violation and outside
the arbiter function given in the Supremacy Clause.
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overturning legislation as enforcement has blinded us to the real
violations in American history that have gone unenforced. 15 It has
also led us to see constitutional violation where there is only
adaptation. This phenomenon is visible across the political
spectrum, among those who genuinely believed that regulation of
the economy and the administrative state was a constitutional
violation, and among those for whom acknowledgment of
governmental interests in cases dealing with individual rights is a
violation of those rights. Constitutions can be violated, but when
they are it is unmistakable, and under these circumstances their
"spare" text has uncontested and serious meaning. Once there is
argument we are not in the realm of violation; and the absence of
authoritative resolution of the argument does not impair the
integrity of constitutional principle, as the absence of finality in
ordinary law impairs that law's integrity.
The most pervasive distortion stemming from Marbury's
enforcement model is of the nature of the ongoing practice of
constitutional law. Precisely because no regular application and
interpretation can be enforcement, it must be adaptation. In
McCulloch, The Least Dangerous Branch, and Poe v. Ullman,
adaptation was linked overtly with innovation. However, all
choice among contending legitimate interpretation of principle is
adaptation, including that made in the name of preservation and
original values.
Liberty of contract and interpretations of
federalism that denied the national government authority to
regulate the economy were adaptations of principle. The model
was Marshall's extension of the contract clause text to
circumstances not immediately in the mind of the framers. These
adaptations, we know from hindsight, drew on traditions the
country rejected, and when they could no longer be accommodated
within the range of values acceptable to existing majorities they
moved out of constitutional law. The renewed judicial defense of
state sovereignty in the 1990s, made in the name of an original
understanding and the Eleventh Amendment,21 is also one
legitimate adaptation of the principle of federalism. Also, it too is
unintelligible except as a choice among values acceptable to
contemporary public opinion. It is part of the turning away from
national and governmental solutions to social and economic
problems that began with deregulation in the late 1970s, and of a
reassessment, visible in many democratic regimes, of the
relationship between national, regional, and local authority.
Twenty-five years ago Thomas Grey demonstrated persuasively
that decisions nationalizing the Bill of Rights and expanding the
215. SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 102-06. See supra text accompanying notes
21-23.
216. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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reach of the Constitution's individual rights provisions during the
middle decades of the twentieth-century were unintelligible as
conventional legal interpretation at the service of enforcement.2
They too were adaptations of principle in terms of contemporary
values, as are subsequent decisions that made different
assessments of public needs and rights of individuals.
The modern Marbury constitution has been under attack from
the time it came into being at the end of the nineteenth-century.
Continued experience only underscores its inadequacy. Neither
ordinary law's enforcement ends nor its means of text and intent
can withstand scrutiny as description of, or prescription for, the
practice of judicial review. The evidence is now sufficient to have
led supporters of the Marbury constitution to abandon text as a
source of constitutional meaning and to look to original intent as
the basis of its enforcement against legislation. But Justice Scalia
defends. originalism as the "lesser evil," not as an intrinsically
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation, and in
invoking the Constitution's legal status even he puts "law" in
quotation marks.2 18 Originalism is the last gasp of the Marbury
constitution. It can never provide a credible account of judicial
invalidation of legislation because constitutional law cannot fulfill
a conventional enforcement function. Originalism is coherent only
as the basis for judicial refusal to reinterpret principle for the
purpose of overturning legislation. It supports the rejection of
substantive due process interpreted to embrace a right of privacy,
but the test of any standard is to account for overturning not
sustaining legislation and for that originalism is totally
inadequate.2 19
The Marbury constitution stays alive because the McCulloch
constitution cannot legitimate authoritative judicial adaptation of
principle. However, the Marbury constitution has an equivalent
defect, that it legitimates an enforcement or preservationist
217. Grey, supra note 17, at 710-14.
218. Scalia, supra note 2, at 854.
219. See the exchange between Scalia and Laurence H. Tribe in which Scalia
conceded Tribe's point that his First Amendment interpretations are
reinterpretations of the Amendment in light of contemporary values. Scalia
defended this departure from originalism as required by the demands of stare
decisis and stability. However, Tribe's point is applicable beyond the First
Amendment, and to defend the range of doctrine to which it applies on the
grounds of stare decisis is another way of saying that originalism and the
Marbury constitution cannot account for the practice of constitutional law.
ANTONIN SCAIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 80-81, 138-39 (1997). See

also supra text accompanying note 210; Robert Post, Justice for Scalia, The
New York Review of Books (June 11, 1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)) (noting Scalia's failure to rely on
originalist principles in holding unconstitutional affirmative action
requirements in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520, 527 (1989)

(Scalia, J. concurring)).
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practice that does not and cannot exist. It is time to recognize that
judicial participation in constitutional adaptation is a new legalpolitical institution that requires complete rethinking of its ends
and means.
I suggested at the outset that this new institution is a
complex mixture of the Marbury and McCulloch constitutions in
which the latter necessarily predominates. What of Marbury
remains in this mixture? Inescapably, Marbury is the precedent
for judicial invalidation of legislative and executive action, a
practice whose, effective validation rests in the unwritten
constitution. Second, and more significantly, Marbury stands for
the proposition that this judicial check is somehow a legal one,
rather than a political one whose judicial performance has been
historically validated. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
defend this proposition fully. Here I would observe that the
Constitution has been legalized to the point where it is impossible
to think about it in any other terms, and where the judicial
relationship to it must reflect this identity if it is to develop
workable internal standards and be brought into tolerable
reconciliation with democratic norms.
Beyond this Marbury's ordinary
law
model is
counterproductive. To the extent constitutional law is a legal
institution it can only be a new form of law, related only
superficially to common and statutory law. Its ends and means
need to be identified and defended in their own terms, in relation
to the political and legal forces that govern collective action. The
Constitution's legal identity must reflect what two centuries of
experience has demonstrated, that the written Constitution is
closer to an unwritten one than to a statute. Identification of the
ends served by authoritative judicial exposition depends on our
capacity to identify the reasons for constitutional law's continued
public support.
Its means are amenable to self-conscious
construction.
The end served by ongoing judicial adaptation of principle, I
would suggest, is reinforcement of the core constitutionalist idea
that political will, particularly popular will, may legitimately be
restrained. The legitimacy of a judicial restraint is tied to the
structural characteristics of legal and judicial decision-making.
These include its privileging of reason over will, the inherent
worth of reason as a check on will, the legal system's openness to
changing community values as brought into court by contending
parties, its requirement that judges confront and answer
contending argument, and the openness of its results to criticism
in these terms."' I am not arguing that the legal system literally
220. See generally, EDWARD
REASONING (1948).

H.

LEVI,

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

LEGAL
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subordinates will to reason, or that the judiciary, cannot become
complicit in the abuse of power. 221 Rather, the centrality of reason
in legal forms allows for reconsideration of the exercise of popular
power without introducing systematic reliance on a partial or
group interest or will. The judiciary, as we have seen, is also no
match for a sufficiently determined and corrupt popular interest or
will2 22 and can impose no restraint the majority is not willing to
accept. It is, however, precisely the absence of any routine
mechanism for restraining ultimate power and of any political
authority superior to popular will that makes institutionalization
of constitutional law the formidable achievement it is. To abandon
it would be to abandon the idea that popular will is subject,
legitimately, to restraint. This, no one across the entire political
spectrum, is willing to do.
Constitutional law's means, on the most general level, is the
adaptation of principle. In its most important respects judicial
adaptation is indistinguishable from legislative adaptation.
However, there are a variety of ways in which judges can adapt
constitutional principles and this provides an opportunity for
imparting to it a legal identity. I do not have a list of specific
means. The main purpose of this paper is to make the case that
whatever they are they need to be consciously constructed and
defended as part of a new field of law in which the McCulloch
constitution is recognized as the only tenable one. However, I will
end by suggesting what these means might look like, by comparing
the work of three defenders of the McCulloch constitution:
Alexander Bickel, Ronald Dworkin, and John Marshall Harlan. I
will argue that of the three only Harlan was in touch with the
extent to which judicial adaptation of principle is a new institution
and a new form of law. Although he did not use this language, his
practice is the best model we have for how it can achieve a legal
221. The clearest example of such complicity is the Dred Scott case. Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
222. "Corrupt" is Gibson's term, arguing in Eakin v Raub that courts are too
weak to enforce a constitution against genuine violation. 12 Serge. & Rawle
330, 355 (1825).

223. Herbert Wechsler observed that:
[IUt has now become a commonplace to grant what many for so long
denied: that courts in constitutional determinations face issues that are
inescapably 'political' . . . in that they involve a choice among competing
values and desires, a choice reflected in the legislative or executive

action in question, which the court must either condemn or condone.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.

L. REV. 1, 15 (1959). Martin Shapiro made the same observation several
decades later: "The judge deciding whether a statute is constitutional...
necessarily replays the same analysis of facts, values, policy alternatives, and
predicted outcomes that was earlier undertaken by the statute .... " TATE ET
AL., THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 43, 61 (C. Neal Tate and
Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
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identity. Bickel and Dworkin, in contrast, applied elements of
Marbury's enforcement model to the adaptation of principle,
undermining in opposite ways constitutional law's legal identity,
and demonstrating in the process Marbury'shold on our thinking.
Bickel's conceptualization of constitutional law as the defense
of long-term principle was closely tied to Brown v. Board of
Education.24 As the segregation it held unconstitutional was part
of a pervasive system of racial injustice and inequality that
constituted this country's most serious constitutional violations,
Brown's repudiation of separate but equal was, simultaneously, a
reinterpretation of the principle of equality in light of
contemporary values and its enforcement against conceded
violation. As the boldness of the Court's action receded, the latter
came to the fore in a consensus that Brown ended, properly, the
wrong of segregation and its national toleration.
The value choices of a regular constitutional law will
necessarily lack comparable consensus on their worth, and it soon
became evident that Bickel was uncomfortable with allowing
judges to make them.225 This discomfort revealed that the judicial
review contemplated in The Least Dangerous Branch was not
adaptation of principle to meet changing needs and understanding
but was its enforcement against genuine violation. As we have
repeatedly seen, however, this ordinary law enforcement
conception is incompatible with any regular practice of
constitutional law. Although he never repudiated the McCulloch
constitution, Bickel could not find a way for judges to interpret
and apply it. In his hands, constitutional law lost its legal
identity, as it did for Thayer, by being deprived of the regularity of
law.
Dworkin also applied Marbury's ordinary law enforcement
model to the principles of the McCulloch constitution, but adopted
that part that assigns to the judiciary responsibility for finality
between contending claims. Dworkin focused his discussion on
what he called the Constitution's "moral principle[s]," those
identifying rights individuals could assert against governmental
authority." 6 He recognized that implementation of moral rights
against government is not part of the assigned judicial
responsibility, and that it is possible to have limited,
constitutional
government
without
authoritative judicial
application and interpretation of its limits. 27 To this extent he
recognized constitutional law to be a new form of law. However,
224. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
225. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA

OF PROGRESS (1970).
226. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996).
227. Id. at 32-34.
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having
once
accepted judicial
responsibility for
this
implementation, as ratified by history, 228 he reasserted Marbury's
assimilation of constitutional law to ordinary law and applied to
the former enforcement concepts derived from the latter. Dworkin
expected courts to enforce moral rights against government with
the same routine finality with which judges enforce legal rights of
individuals against each other.
Appropriation of ordinary law's rights-based enforcement
mechanism undermines constitutional law's legal identity by its
built-in result orientation that is a derogation of the requirement
of openness and that denies to contending parties a genuine day in
court. The existence of ordinary legal rights and of their judicial
determination in particular cases is an uncontested given of our
system of dispute resolution. The existence of constitutional or
moral rights, in contrast, is always contested political ground. To
assimilate adaptation of the Constitution's principled limits to
enforcement of ordinary legal rights is to privilege an individualist
conception of the limited, liberal Constitution over others that
attach greater value to collective and community claims. Uniform
support for individual rights claims, or for particular ones, is not
the inevitable result of assimilating constitutional to ordinary
legal rights. However, it is its general propensity, and is so for
Dworkin, as evident from his identification of Warren Court
adjudication as the model for its proper practice.229
Harlan's constitutional law avoided both of these difficulties.
Unlike Bickel's, his was committed to the regularity of law. It is
significant that Harlan defended adaptationist practice in the
context of substantive due process, not a particular and atypical
case such as Brown. Racial segregation, in Harlan's judicial
review, was an arbitrary imposition and purposeless restraint
reachable by the Constitution,2 0 but it was one point on a
continuum,
not judicial
review's
defining
moment
or
representative of its operation.
By affirming the McCulloch
constitution in the course of reviving substantive due process,
Harlan accepted the full range of judicial value choices required by
regular constitutional interpretation.
Unlike Dworkin, Harlan counseled restraint in the judicial
adaptation of principle. 2 1 The term restraint carries unexamined
meanings developed under the Marbury constitution and it would
be better to find another term. However, this is the one Harlan
used and some kind of restraint is an appropriate means for the
judicial adaptation of principle. Restraint is a substitute for the
228. Id. at 34-35.
229. Id. at 3.
230. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
231. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501-02 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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constraint on judicial will and value choices built into ordinary law
by its greater substantive content, and by the legitimatization of
such choices by its assigned arbiter function. Restraint counsels
respect for the moral worth of contending conceptions of principle
and the fallibility of human reason. It is a reminder that attempts
to "enforce" principle, short of the genuine violation, with the
regularity of ordinary law, lends itself to an insupportable
moralizing.
Harlan's restraint was not a tactical compromise between
contending legitimate interpretations of principle. Nor was it
deference to the political branches for the sake of deference.
Harlan's opinions upholding as well as overturning governmental
action were thoughtful interpretations of the Constitution that
compel those who disagree to meet him on these terms. Equally
important, nothing in Harlan's restraint restricted initiative,
leadership and statesmanship in the adaptation of principle.
These dimensions of judicial authority are inescapable
consequences of constitutional law's merger of law and principle.
Harlan's most significant act of leadership was revival of
substantive due process, a doctrine that is, at once, at the heart of
this new form of law and that contains the potential for great
abuse. In 1961 the latter predominated and the doctrine was in
disrepute. Harlan nevertheless revived it, tying it to the past in a
lawyerly way, while defending the expansion of judicial authority
it necessarily entails.232 The ultimate acceptance of substantive
due process on the Court233 and by much of the profession reflects
the soundness of Harlan's identification of the McCulloch
constitution as the centerpiece of modern constitutional law.
CONCLUSION

The legal aspirations of constitutional law will always be
harder to meet than those of ordinary law, but Harlan's example
indicates they are not unrealistic. He demonstrated that it is
possible to maintain the regularity of law, while avoiding a
moralizing partisanship. Harlan was a political moderate, which
undoubtedly made it easier for him than others to practice
restraint in the judicial defense of principle. However, political
moderation is not the essence of constitutional law's legal identity
or of its proper restraint. That rests in a commitment to the use of
judicial authority, sensitivity in the occasions for its use, and the
quality of judicial reasoning. It rests in political judgment.
232. See Harlan's discussion of the precedents for substantive due process in
Poe, 367 U.S. at 541-44. Few of those cited were direct precedents for
substantive due process and it is not surprising that his opinion did not attract
additional support in the Court.
233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-50 (1992).
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Harlan's is not the last word on constitutional law, but
literally the first. It is the first to identify the commitments of this
new institution, freed from the enforcement myths surrounding its
origin. It draws its strength from retrieval of the enduring
differences in kind between fundamental law and ordinary law as
understood by the founding generation.
The particular
components of this new form of law that Harlan identified, as well
as those offered here, are less important than recognition of
constitutional law's evolutionary origin and the full novelty of its
ends and means.

